This document contains Chapter 4 of the book.
Is minimizing interaction a solution to cultural and maturity inequality in offshore outsourcing?

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Abstract. Many companies consider and some undertake outsourcing of their software development activities. Often, information systems development is outsourced to vendors in different cultures or with a different level of software-process maturity. Recommendations for managing such offshore outsourcing arrangements typically involve more interaction between the client and the vendor to understand each other’s culture better, improve communication, form partnerships and the like. We have studied a client that did the opposite. On the basis of a case study, we describe how the interaction between the client and the vendor was minimized on purpose. On the basis of a case study, we describe how the interaction between the client and the vendor was minimized on purpose. What mechanisms were used? What worked and what did not? We conclude that minimizing interaction can be a viable strategy to follow when clients face large cultural and maturity inequality in offshoring their software development activities but that the strategy also has important limitations.

Keywords: Offshore outsourcing, culture, maturity, minimal-interaction strategy, extra costs.

1 Introduction

Many companies consider and undertake outsourcing of the development of information systems (IS). It has been estimated that global IS outsourcing will reach $260 billion by 2009 (Vitharana & Dharwadkar, 2007) and that it will grow at an
annual rate of about 30% in the foreseeable future (Fish & Seydel, 2006). The reported benefits of IS outsourcing have been reduced time and cost, increased quality, improved business performance, and increased ability to concentrate on the core of the business (McFarlan & DeLacey, 2004). Recently, offshore outsourcing has become popular because large numbers of technically skilled developers are being educated in countries such as India where wages are low compared to Western Europe and North America, in which skilled developers are in short supply. Offshore outsourcing is defined as ‘the subcontracting of an activity by a client organization to an independent service provider working from an overseas destination’ (Vlaar, van Fenema, & Tiwari, 2008, p. 228) or simply as ‘inter-country outsourcing’ (King & Torkzadeh, 2008, p. 207).

While geographic distance is a defining characteristic of offshore outsourcing, the challenge is not geography as such but overcoming communication bottlenecks, knowledge asymmetries, psychological dissociation, and socio-cultural differences. General recommendations to manage collaboration at a distance include establishing common ground at the outset and distributing tasks such that only loosely coupled tasks are allocated to different sites (Olson & Olson, 2000). For offshore outsourcing, two specific challenges are that the client and the vendor often have different cultures and are at different levels of maturity with respect to their software-development processes. To handle these challenges, it is frequently recommended to increase interaction, learn more about the culture of the other part, communicate more, form partnerships, or the like (Bhat, Gupta, & Murthy, 2006; Hendry, 1995; Krishna, Sahay, & Walsham, 2004).

In this study, we analyze a company that did the opposite, namely minimized interaction between the client and the vendor. This approach is contrary to the prevalent recommendations in the literature, and we therefore consider it interesting to study. In doing so, our research question is whether minimal interaction between client and vendor is a practicable way to overcome cultural and maturity inequality in offshore outsourcing. We note up-front that minimal interaction is not a panacea. The company has experienced costs and challenges with its minimal-interaction approach. The approach has, however, been successful in the sense that at the time we concluded this study, the company decided to renew its outsourcing contract with its Indian vendor on the same terms as the previous four years.

The next section sets the context for our study by describing related work on offshore outsourcing, culture, and maturity. Section 3 accounts for the method we used in our empirical study, and Section 4 introduces the client and vendor organizations. Section 5 analyzes the client’s minimal-interaction approach to off-
shoring and identifies the mechanisms established to succeed with this approach. Section 6 discusses how the minimal-interaction approach has affected the client’s software development activities and at what costs.

2 Related work

In continuation of Hertzum and Jørgensen’s (2011) introduction to offshore outsourcing in Chapter 1, this section provides more detail about previous work on offshore outsourcing and on the cultural and maturity inequality that is often associated with it.

2.1 Offshore outsourcing

Carmel and Agarwal (2002) propose four stages of offshore outsourcing of information systems development. An organization is at the first stage if it is still an offshoring bystander. While there may be a variety of reasons for remaining at this stage, more and more organizations choose to proceed to one of the subsequent stages. Organizations at the second stage start experimenting with offshoring, for example, through pilot projects. Often, their motivation for offshoring is the unavailability of onshore developers rather than a proactive focus on offshore possibilities. Loaded wages for skilled Indian developers at 30–50% of onshore wages in Western Europe and North America is an important motivator for offshoring, but rarely realized at this stage. One reason for this is that the stage is transitional; when some experience has been gained and cost savings start to occur, organizations move to the next stage. At the third stage, organizations are characterized by a proactive cost focus. A typical recommendation at this stage is to restrict offshoring to non-core and structured tasks, such as construction based on detailed specifications (e.g., Cusick & Prasad, 2006). Often, onshore project managers receive targets specifying that a certain percentage of the developer hours on their projects should be offshore developer hours. At least one study finds that onshore staff tended to perceive offshore developers as cheap worker-bees who could be ordered around (Levina & Vaast, 2008). At the fourth stage, organizations no longer view offshoring as simply a source of low cost work but adopt a proactive strategic focus. The strategic objectives pursued at this stage include access to new markets and offshoring of entire projects, from requirements to support, also of
projects involving innovation and new product development. The best offshoring practices described by Bhat et al. (2006) appear to be directed solely at this fourth stage and focus on achieving shared goals, culture, processes, and responsibilities for the client and the vendor.

While the vast majority of research looks at offshoring from the client’s point of view, some studies do investigate vendors’ views on offshoring (e.g., Bhat et al., 2006; Oza & Hall, 2005). A theme common to client and vendor research is asymmetries in knowledge and experience. These asymmetries concern, among other things, the business domain, typically with the client in possession of business knowledge and the vendor less so (e.g., Levina & Vaast, 2008), and development processes, typically with vendors that have more structured development processes than clients (e.g., Oza & Hall, 2005). Technical knowledge exhibits another type of asymmetry in that the vendor typically employs a large pool of technically skilled developers while this resource is scarcer onshore.

The top risks associated with offshore outsourcing include a lack of commitment from the top management, miscommunication of requirements, inadequate user involvement, failure to manage end-user expectations, and poor change control (Iacovou & Nakatsu, 2008). These risks do not appear to be specific to offshoring but rather to apply to information systems development in general (cf. Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, & Cule, 2001). Some of the top risks associated with offshoring are, however, specific to offshoring, including language barriers, lack of offshore project management know-how by the client, lack of technical or business know-how by the offshore team, and failure to consider all costs (Iacovou & Nakatsu, 2008). Many client organizations expect cost reductions from their offshoring arrangements due to the lower offshore wages but have not fully understood all the costs involved in outsourcing (Barthélemy, 2001). Dibbern et al. (2008) identify specification costs, design costs, knowledge-transfer costs, coordination costs, and control costs as the five main categories in which clients face extra costs when projects are offshored. The five categories of extra costs relate to the less effective possibilities of communication between the client and the vendor and the resulting degradation in their mutual awareness of each other’s work and day-to-day activities.

2.2 The role of culture

Hofstede (2001, p. 9) defines culture as ‘the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another’. Hofstede’s work shows that even within a single organization, different national
groups of employees exhibit different cultural characteristics. These characteristics have been specified in terms of five cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, and long-/short-term orientation (Hofstede, 2001). It appears that managers in organizations chronically underestimate the magnitude and importance of cultural differences (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005).

Prior surveys indicate that national culture is a leading cause of problems in the offshoring of services (Metters, 2008). Metters (2008), for example, refers to a survey where 60 executives involved in offshoring information technology (IT) services cited “cultural differences” as the most important problem in relation to offshoring. Also, Terdiman and Berg’s (2001) framework for evaluating a potential offshoring country has “cultural issues” as one of three main areas. The interest in nearshoring is another indication that similar cultural characteristics, such as ways of doing business, are considered important to outsourcing decisions (Carmel & Abbott, 2007). In contrast to nearshoring, offshoring typically implies profound cultural differences between client and vendor.

In relation to the client and vendor countries of this study, Denmark and India differ along several of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions but in particular with respect to power distance, which is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. In India power distance is very high; in Denmark it is very low (Hofstede, 2001). Consequently, in the Danish business culture, rank and title are less important than in India where hierarchical forms of behaviour are expected. In Denmark, subordinates are expected to speak up and offer suggestions; in India superiors and seniors enjoy more respect, and decisions tend to be top–down. This affects, for example, communication styles and ownership of results (Schomer, 2006).

Recommendations for handling cultural differences in offshoring arrangements include facilitated communication sessions (Dubé & Paré, 2001), building consensus on norms for meetings and deadlines (Paré & Dubé, 1999), and other efforts to establish a shared culture (Bhat et al., 2006).

2.3 Maturity and software process improvement

Maturity models are used to improve the performance of organizations, processes, technology, and people. The Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is a framework describing a five-step path for software process improvement (Pauk, Curtis,
The path describes key processes and goals at each of the five levels. An organization has to meet the goals at one level to proceed to the next level. For example, to go from the basic level 1, in which behavior is characterized by being ad hoc and intuitive, to level 2, you need to achieve the goals incorporated in six key process areas: requirements management, subcontractor management, project planning, project tracking, quality assurance, and configuration management. CMM has become so popular that a large number of other models using the same five-step path have been invented, including People-CMM, Integrated Product Development CMM, Systems Acquisition CMM, and Testing Maturity Model. Finally, a large number of the CMM models have been summoned in CMM-integrated – or just CMMI (Ahern, Clouse, & Turner, 2008; Chrissis, Konrad, & Shrum, 2003).

In relation to offshore outsourcing, it is noteworthy that India has embraced CMMI. Four countries in the world have used the CMMI model extensively: Australia, India, Japan, and the US (India Express Computer, 2003). The highest level of maturity is level 5, and in 2003 as much as 75% of all the companies in the world at level 5 were from India (Mohnot, 2003). In Denmark, only one or two companies have reached level 5 (Pries-Heje, Nørbjerg, Aaen, & Elisberg, 2008) and the majority of Danish companies are at level 1. Thus, when Indian and Danish organizations enter into offshoring arrangements there may be huge maturity inequalities between them.

3 Method

Our empirical study is a case study based on interviews in one Danish organization (which after our study merged with a Norwegian organization). The case study is single-case and embedded (type 2) according to the typology by Yin (2009). We have not obtained data from the vendor. Thus, the empirical data are restricted to a client-side perspective on offshoring. One of the authors has worked with the organization since 2003 and has carried out several assessments and training sessions in the organization in 2003–2007. We believe that it is fair to claim that this author has extensive knowledge on how software development is carried out in the organization.

Concerning offshore outsourcing, however, the case study reported here took place in 2008 and was carried out by both authors. We conducted an initial interview with three staff members involved in the client’s offshoring at the managerial
level. During this interview, we got an overview of the client’s offshore-outsourcing history and identified seven persons for in-depth interviews. The interviewees comprised persons involved in or responsible for (1) the start-up of the offshoring activities, (2) the entire course of offshoring activities, (3) the offshoring contract, (4) the offshore development centre, (5) concrete offshoring projects and certification of offshore staff, and (6) improvement of the client’s development processes; and (7) an offshore coordinator recently returned from a long-term placement at the vendor.

The seven in-depth interviews were loosely structured by an interview guide addressing:

- The offshoring arrangement between the client and the vendor, and its evolution
- Client–vendor interactions at the levels of the offshore agreement, projects, and individual staff
- The creation of a project identity in projects involving offshoring
- The coordination of such projects
- Initiatives undertaken to facilitate offshoring and the lessons learned from them
- Issues relating to differences in the cultural background of onshore and offshore staff

In addition, the interviewees were asked to reflect upon the factors critical to the client’s experience with offshoring. This part of the interviews was based on a walkthrough of Iacovou and Nakatsu’s (2008) ten-item list of top offshoring risk factors.

The interviews were conducted at the client’s premises, except one interview which for practical reasons was conducted at the authors’ university. The initial interview was documented in written notes; the in-depth interviews were audio-recorded, and subsequently an extensive written record of the main points was produced. The written record included selected quotes, but the interviews, which lasted 1–2 hours, were not transcribed verbatim. The interviews were analyzed by reading through the written records several times, noting issues stated in individual interviews and patterns emerging across interviews. These issues and patterns were then grouped into themes, resulting in the analysis in this chapter.
4 The empirical setting

At the time of this study the client was a Danish organization with approximately 850 employees, some 450 of which were directly involved in the development of IT systems. The client has subsequently become the Danish part of Nets. The client has for 40 years developed and hosted services for the Danish banks, particularly with regard to payment solutions. The financial sector is characterized by high volumes of safety-critical transactions and, thereby, a need for efficient and secure systems. Moreover, the financial sector is dynamic with changes in national and, increasingly, international legislation forcing revisions of systems, with mergers and acquisitions among banks necessitating integration or redesign of systems, and with considerable competition among providers of financial services creating continual pressure for the development of new services.

After an early, unsuccessful attempt at outsourcing in the late 1980s, the client refrained from further attempts during the next decade. In 2000, the client started offshoring to India, and in 2002 they started working with their current vendor. The vendor is an Indian software-development organization, which employs over 8000 software developers and has years of experience as an offshore-outsourcing vendor of financial and other services. While the vendor has been certified at CMM level five since 2002 and CMMI since 2006, the interviewees estimate that the client is at CMM level 1 or 2. The collaboration between the client and the vendor has been going on for six years prior to this study, and it has been decided that the collaboration will continue for at least four more years by renewing the contract without changing anything but its date of expiry.

The client’s rationale for entering into an offshoring relationship was to increase capacity. This is stated by several interviewees, who also state that thanks to this increased capacity the client has been able to carry through projects it would otherwise have been unable to take on.

5 Offshore outsourcing with minimal interaction

When setting up an offshore arrangement, some interaction is required to negotiate the terms of cooperation, write a contract, and start working together (Willcocks & Lacity, 2006). In the phase following – the operational phase (Cullen, Seddon, & Willcocks, 2006) – there also needs to be some interaction; the salient question is: how much? At one end, we can talk about minimal interaction, that
is, just enough to make things work. Minimal interaction is about paying as little transaction cost (Williamson, 1979) as possible. Minimal interaction also entails that as few changes as possible are made in the client’s and vendor’s internal processes. It should be noted that when one reduces transaction costs, the remaining interaction will appear to be more intensive at particular contact points. At the other end, we can maximize interaction trying to come as close together as possible. This may involve more communication, more learning about the culture of the other part, trying to balance maturity, forming a partnership, and maybe even blurring the distinction between a client and a vendor.

5.1 Keeping distance

An illustrative example of minimal interaction is project A of the Danish organization we are studying. This was the first project the client offshored to the vendor. The project, which lasted three years, consisted of converting an existing system to another platform. That is, the existing system in itself comprised a complete and, by definition, fully accurate specification. Such a task involves little analysis and design compared to the amount of programming. This characteristic of project A was the main reason it was chosen for offshoring and it implied that the client could specify the project very accurately and very easily. This made the project suitable for the client’s minimal-interaction strategy because minimal interaction could be attained at low risk.

Also, project A was only economically feasible for the client if it could be offshored. The project showed that the vendor had the technical knowledge required to make the conversion. Very few errors were detected during testing, and some of them turned out to be errors in the “specification”, that is, hitherto unnoticed errors in the old system.

After having completed project A, it was decided to set up a more permanent outsourcing relationship between the client in Denmark and the vendor in India. It was at this point that the idea of minimized interaction really came into play. A manager says: ‘The point of departure is that they are vendors. They are not employees. They are a vendor like an external company we cooperate with. The idea was to establish it out there [i.e., at the vendor], so that they can maintain their culture and keep working the way they are used to; and people here [i.e., at the client] work in their way. Actually, reducing the need for intercultural interaction to as little as possible was part of what I was trying to accomplish.’
5.2 Exchanging people

The client has made use of two mechanisms for exchanging people to accomplish offshoring projects while maintaining minimal interaction. Both mechanisms involve intensive interaction but for selected people and selected periods of time. First, offshore developers have been on placements at the client to work with onshore staff. This mimics how new onshore IT developers acquire business knowledge, but in addition to improving the offshore developers’ business knowledge it has also facilitated the general relationship between onshore and offshore staff. However, the placements require that onshore staff has the necessary time for communicating and interacting with the offshore developers; and the placements temporarily cancel the economical effect of offshoring because the offshore developers get onshore wages while they are onshore.

Second, the client has placed an offshore coordinator at the vendor. The few onshore employees who have had this position have been at the vendor on long-term placements. The offshore coordinator has a mediating role involving frequent phone contact with client staff, with whom they are well connected, and participation in project meetings with vendor staff. Collaboration between the offshore coordinator and vendor staff is face-to-face, thus avoiding the limitations of communication and collaboration at a distance and providing more opportunities for becoming aware of cultural and maturity issues in need of attention. Periodic onshore visits have been necessary for the offshore coordinators to maintain their network among the client staff. Moreover, the vendor may occasionally feel that the presence of the offshore coordinators transgresses the client–vendor boundary.

In addition to these two mechanisms, an effort has been made to motivate offshore developers to work for the client for a longer period of time. In the Indian offshore-outsourcing industry, it is not uncommon for IT developers to begin to move into the management ranks after only a couple of years as developers. This is very different from the career path of Danish developers, who often work a decade or more as developers in the same business area. This cultural difference threatens the client’s minimal-interaction strategy because the continuous renewal of offshore developers implies that most of them will have insufficient business knowledge. The client has therefore aimed at making their relationship with the vendor sufficiently interesting for offshore developers to make it attractive for them to stay for a longer period of time. The onshore placements of offshore developers have been effective in this regard.
5.3 Exchanging knowledge

The client has set up business courses at the vendor. The courses have been run by visiting onshore staff and by some of the offshore developers who have been on onshore placements. In some areas of the client’s business, the courses form an entire certification program, which ensures that offshore developers have a basic understanding of the business area for which they develop systems. While the offshore developers are not at a level of business understanding comparable to the onshore staff, improving their understanding of the business increases their ability to work autonomously and decreases the amount of interaction they need to have with the client staff.

The courses and certification programs are an attempt to exchange knowledge in concentrated packages and with several offshore developers at a time. This is considered preferable to frequent ad hoc interactions, which are complicated by the geographic distance. Extensive ad hoc interaction is also seen as time consuming, especially to the client, and therefore as being contrary to the intention of shifting work from the client to the vendor. A manifestation of this is that a single point of contact has been enforced when offshore staff needs to communicate with onshore quality-assessment staff. This has been decided upon to protect the majority of the onshore staff from becoming engaged in too many, time-consuming communications. In this case, it appears that the client has been more concerned with not making offshoring unpopular among its onshore staff than with providing the offshore staff with access to the required knowledge, especially business knowledge.

Restricting access to the required knowledge to minimize interaction creates problems because it prolongs the period during which business knowledge is unevenly distributed between the client and the vendor. As an example, the present assessment of the client’s largest ongoing offshore project, project B, is that it has been hard to strike the proper balance between technical and business development. Project B consists of converting a standalone system that has been maintained for more than two decades into a set of services available to other systems. This conversion requires both technical and business knowledge, but the uneven distribution of knowledge between the client and the vendor entails that the vendor, who is involved in the project with a massive 300–400 person years, often has only the technical knowledge. In working on project B, the vendor proceeds on the basis of its technical knowledge and remains unaware of some of the issues that might warrant further business considerations. An example of the need for further business considerations is to weigh the evolving understanding of the potentially
available services and the amount of work involved in extracting them from the old system against the benefit of the services to the client’s other systems. The client has the business knowledge pertinent to such considerations but lacks detailed knowledge about the amount of work involved in extracting the services and is at too great a distance from the vendor’s day-to-day work to spot the windows of opportunity for discussions about the extraction of some of the potential services. In addition, the client has not been able to specify up front the full set of services to be extracted. As a consequence, opportunities are unintentionally missed and project B becomes to an excessive extent about technically reprogramming a system.

5.4 Developing software in two places with minimal interaction

Today, the client uses the vendor in India on a regular basis. Project B provides an interesting example because the client considers a move toward a more service-oriented architecture crucial to enable reuse across systems and to enable flexible assignment of the development of individual services to onshore or offshore groups with the ability and capacity to take them on. A main reason for completely reprogramming the system is, however, that the existing system has evolved over a long period of time, and due to extensive changes in the staff working on the system nobody any longer has a comprehensive overview of the programming code. In addition, the documentation is not trusted to be current. Thus, it has become exceedingly difficult and costly to make revisions of the system (cf. Naur, 1985). The capacity and lower price of the offshore vendor compared to onshore developers make it feasible to solve these difficulties by reprogramming the system from scratch.

However, turning a system into a set of services is not merely a programming task but one that requires considerable understanding of the client’s business and suite of systems. Such knowledge is necessary to know the applications to which a service is relevant and the differences in what these applications require from the service – business-wise as well as in terms of technical architecture. To overcome this challenge, the client decided to apply use cases (Cockburn, 2008; Jacobson, Christerson, Jonsson, & Overgaard, 1992). At first, some of the offshore developers that had been on onshore placements, but had returned to India, were asked to lead the writing of use cases in India. It was agreed to use a writing style with four abstraction levels with the first being mostly business oriented and the fourth very technically oriented. But when the results came in, the more business oriented use-case levels just consisted of pointers to lower levels, and the client discovered
that it took way too much effort to review the very detailed technical use cases at
the fourth level. Thus, that way of dividing work did not minimize interaction. In
the second round, business staff at the client was taught to write use cases. These
upper-level use cases were then given to the vendor who wrote the technical levels.
This proved to minimize interaction much better.

6 Discussion

Cultural differences between the client and the vendor are an inherent character-
istic of offshore outsourcing. For offshoring to India it is also common that the
vendor’s development processes are at a higher maturity level than the client’s
development processes (Levina & Vaast, 2008; Vlaar et al., 2008). The case in-
vestigated in this study concerns whether such inequalities can be handled by
minimizing the interaction between the client and the vendor.

6.1 Costs and challenges of minimal interaction

Project A is an example of minimizing interaction. While the project was successful
in the sense that the offshoring arrangement produced a high-quality system, it
was restricted in the sense that only a modest part of the activities of a full project
were performed by the vendor. The entire project A was offshored to the vendor,
but project A was special in the sense that it consisted almost exclusively of pro-
gramming. In this sense project B is a better example of the client’s minimizing
interaction strategy because a larger amount and variety of development activities
were offshored to the vendor.

The division of work between the client and the vendor has shifted in the course
of the offshoring arrangement. Early in the offshore arrangement the bottleneck
was the middle part of the systems-development process. It was difficult to offshore
enough coding activities to the vendor and test the quality of the produced code.
Today, the bottleneck has moved to the front and back ends of the process. About
400 people are ready to work at the vendor site, starting from business oriented
use cases and delivering integrated code ready for acceptance. The hard part now,
tells a manager at the client, is to get the business people to write enough, high-
quality use cases – that is, to decide and specify how they want the business pro-
cesses to be.
The main limitation of the client’s approach has been that to minimize interaction with the vendor, it has become necessary to perform considerable extra work. This work is required to enable the vendor to take on tasks in spite of its limited business knowledge. The extra work consists of preparing tasks for offshoring, preparing the vendor for working in the client’s application domain, and assessing the quality of the vendor’s work. In the terminology of Dibbern et al. (2008), this extra work corresponds to specification costs, knowledge-transfer costs, and control costs. While the knowledge-transfer activities and certification programs are intended to gradually enable the client to offshore the specification of systems and the assessment of work products also, the currently offshored activities are somewhat biased toward programming. Thus, the client has been succeeding in the offshoring of programming but, at least currently, at the cost of extra work on other activities. Compared to previous onshore development, the client’s activities have shifted toward the start and end of the development process.

This shift has important consequences for the client. First, it implies that the client is to a considerable extent doing work in order not to have to do work. The amounts of extra work have not been fully foreseen, and cultural differences entail that the extra work is perceived differently by the client and the vendor. For example, the vendor organizes activities partly from the implicit perspective that hours are cheap and capacity large, but this perspective is defective when some of the hours (e.g., control activities) are to be performed by the client. It is an ongoing learning process to identify and reduce areas of extra work but also to realize that offshoring is increasing the amount of some of the client’s tasks. Second, the extra work may exceed the capacity of the client staff and thereby prevent the client from offshoring as much work as the vendor would be able to perform. While the bottleneck that initially motivated the client to offshore was perceived as a shortage of programming capacity, it may now emerge as a shortage in the client’s capacity to specify systems and control work products. This way, the uneven distribution of business knowledge may be the factor that limits the client’s minimal-interaction approach to offshoring, making a reduction of the knowledge asymmetry central to continued success with this approach. Third, the tasks of the client staff are changing. This implies that the client staff increasingly needs a different mix of competences with more focus on business understanding and abilities to facilitate the formulation of requirements, the transformation of requirements into system specifications, and the follow-up on whether developed systems match business requirements. Some client staff may welcome this change of focus; others may be reluctant to give up the time spent on programming in favour of activities at which they feel less proficient and comfortable. Fourth, the
client is at a considerably lower level of software-process maturity than the vendor, as indicated by the interviewees’ estimate that the client is at CMM level 1 or 2, whereas the vendor is certified at CMM level 5. This implies that the client does not have strong processes in place for making precise and detailed specifications and for thorough quality assessment. In the absence of such processes, it is a demanding and novel task for the client to make, especially, specifications that are sufficiently precise and detailed to define the vendor’s tasks in the development of the systems.

6.2 Conway’s law

Conway’s law (Conway, 1968) states that ‘organizations which design systems … are constrained to produce designs which are copies of the communication structures of these organizations.’ Thus, the communication bottleneck between the client and the vendor in offshoring arrangements will lead to system designs that reproduce this structure. Conway concludes that flexibility of organization is central to effective design. Flexibility is needed to be able to adjust the organizational structure to a system architecture that matches the needs of the use situation. Because designers’ understanding of these needs will probably evolve during the development process, flexibility of organization is required throughout the development process, not just when projects are set up.

Conway argues that especially for large systems the required flexibility is rarely present and that the structures of large systems therefore tend to disintegrate during development. This disintegration is the result of a three-step process. First, when designers realize that a system will be large they are tempted to assign too many people to the project. This temptation is exacerbated by access to a large pool of development staff, as is typical in offshoring. Second, in a large project the communication paths must be restricted in order to avoid a scenario in which communication consumes all people’s time, as exemplified by the single point of contact enforced between offshore staff and the client’s quality-assessment staff. This causes the communication structure to disintegrate. Third, Conway’s law ensures that the disintegration of the communication structure will be reproduced in the system structure, which therefore also disintegrates. This argument appears pertinent to offshoring because the client gets access to the vendor’s large pool of development staff and because the communication between client and vendor is restricted by their physical separation (e.g., Herbsleb, 2007; Herbsleb & Grinter, 1999).
In projects A and B, we can clearly explain part of what we see by applying Conway’s law. Project A, for example, complied with Conway’s law by reproducing the organizational separation between an onshore group with business knowledge and an offshore group with technical knowledge in the system: The system was completely rebuilt technically but remained completely unchanged functionally (as it was planned). This was not a problem for project A itself because it was the client’s first offshore project and a lot was learned from it. However, project B gives some indication that the client’s aim of eventually offshoring entire projects from requirements to implementation is still hampered by the uneven distribution of business knowledge. This makes communication about business knowledge a central bottleneck because it leads to missed opportunities in the offshore developed systems.

6.3 An end point or a transitory stage?

Whereas the point of departure for the minimal-interaction strategy was to maintain a clear separation between the client and the vendor, the alternatives to minimal interaction involve transcending this view of the vendor as a fully external company. Madsen and Bødker (2010) provide a framework for discussing such alternatives in terms of four different strategies for managing the relationship between the client and the vendor in offshore outsourcing. The framework differentiates between a business friend and a business person and is based on the assumption that ‘in a situation where much interaction and cooperation is needed to ensure high performance the business friend role is the most suitable, while in a situation where goals can be measured and/or the task is well understood, the “business person” perspective is the most appropriate’ (Madsen & Bødker, 2010, p. 8). The four strategies are select-a-friend and develop-a-friend (both with a business-friend perspective) and control-a-person and control-of-output (both with a business-person perspective).

The minimizing interaction strategy entails a strong preference for a business-person perspective, rather than a business-friend perspective. This points toward a clear separation between onshore client tasks, such as system specification and quality assessment, and offshore vendor tasks, such as detailed use cases and coding. Conversely, Madsen and Bødker (2010), see also Madsen et al. (2011) in Chapter 5, analyze an offshore outsourcing arrangement that aims to dissolve the distinction between the employees of the client and the vendor in favour of looking at them as a joint pool of staff resources. This has led to the introduction of multiple business-
friend practices, for example, about 20% of the vendor staff is, at any given time, on onshore placements. Such practices are costly and stand in stark contrast to the single point of contact enforced in our case between offshore staff and onshore quality-assessment staff. However, reducing or dissolving the distinction between onshore client tasks and offshore vendor tasks may be necessary to avoid that a shortage of onshore staff becomes a chronic bottleneck in the offshoring arrangement. The presence of such a bottleneck suggests that a strategy of minimizing interaction may not scale well and that the client may eventually be faced with a choice between:

- Offshoring only the tasks for which the client has the onshore resources to make detailed specifications and conduct thorough quality assessments
- Transitioning to another strategy where higher transaction costs are accepted to (gradually) avoid the scenario in which certain tasks can only be performed by onshore client staff

A transition from a business-person to a business-friend perspective resembles the transition from the third to the fourth stage in Carmel and Agarwal’s (2002) maturity model for offshoring arrangements. Carmel and Agarwal (2002) formulate the difference between these two stages as a difference between a proactive cost focus and a proactive strategic focus. In Madsen and Bodker’s (2010) case, there is evidence of practices reflecting a business-friend perspective as well as practices reflecting a business-person perspective, indicating that the two perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, the onshore placements, courses, and certification program in our case have business-friend elements, which complement the predominant business-person perspective. The client is well aware that these elements are central to improving the vendor staff’s business understanding and, thereby, the range of tasks they can perform competently. The client’s aim is that the courses and certification program will make it possible to offshore system specification and quality assessment to the vendor in addition to programming. To the client, this is consistent with the minimizing-interaction strategy, not a deviation from it, because the vendor will be able to perform still more tasks autonomously. This way it may become possible to offshore more work while maintaining that each task is allocated to either onshore client staff or offshore vendor staff. If the client and vendor succeed in this, the minimizing-interaction strategy may solve the current capacity bottlenecks. It appears, however, that the communication bottlenecks pointed out by Conway (1968) remain a limitation with negative consequences for the developed systems.
7 Conclusion

Minimizing the interaction between the client and the vendor is contrary to common recommendations about how to conduct offshore outsourcing. Yet, this chapter shows that the strategy followed by the client in our study was one of minimizing interaction. Concretely, we have shown how keeping distance, exchanging people, and exchanging knowledge can be used to develop software in a way that minimizes interaction. It should be noted, however, that achieving minimized interaction requires a lot of work. It is not a cheap solution; the price incurred by the client was larger than expected. In addition, the minimizing-interaction strategy may foster communication structures with negative effects on the structure of the developed systems.

A major consequence of the client’s minimizing-interaction strategy has been that the onshore staff’s work is shifting toward making specifications and conducting quality assessments. This shift happens to make use of the offshore capacity of vendor staff who are skilled in coding, but it has also revealed that the modest maturity level in the onshore software processes creates a new bottleneck that makes it difficult for the client to perform the necessary quantities of detailed specifications and thorough quality assessments. While the minimizing-interaction strategy has enabled the client to carry out projects, it would otherwise not have been able to take on; the strategy has been most successful in projects for which a complete specification could be produced up front. The strategy has been more of a challenge in projects for which business opportunities were, in part, realized in the course of the projects. We conclude that minimizing interaction can be a viable strategy to follow when clients and vendors face cultural and maturity inequality in offshore outsourcing. However, the strategy has limitations that are important to consider in deciding whether to adopt it.

Acknowledgements
This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at ECIS2009. We wish to thank Sofia Knudsen and Magnus Hansen for their support in documenting the interviews. Special thanks are due to the interviewees for their openness and their willingness to take part in our study in spite of their busy schedules.

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